Recent Reads: The Guns of August, 1964

A Review of Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

By Edwin E. Moïse, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019

This oil on canvas painted by Commander E.J. Fitzgerald in January 1965 depicts the engagement between USS Maddox (DD 731) and three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats on August 2, 1964. The U.S. response to the notional North Vietnamese attack in the Gulf of Tonkin two days later marked the beginning of the Navy’s air and surface bombardments against North Vietnam. (Courtesy of the Navy Art Collection)

By A.J. Orlikoff
Hampton Roads Naval Museum Educator

Few events in U.S. naval history are as enigmatic and controversial as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The reported attacks on the U.S. Navy destroyers USS Maddox (DD 731) and USS Turner Joy (DD 951) in early August 1964 off North Vietnam was a turning point in the course of what became the Vietnam War. The escalation of the conflict, in the form of Operation Pierce Arrow retaliatory airstrikes and the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution marked a transition of the United States’ role in South Vietnam to that of a support role to an active military participant.

At the heart of the controversy of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are a few key questions: Did the North Vietnamese attack American ships? What was the extent of such attacks? To what extent did American decision makers know about the veracity of the reported attacks? Moreover, how did these reported attacks and their veracity, or lack thereof, influence the escalation of the Vietnam War? Clemson University history professor Edwin E. Moïse, in Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, provides answers to these questions in a thorough, illuminating, and sober manner. Through a vigorous and superlative interrogation of primary sources, Moïse sheds light on the murky story of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in a way no other historian has, producing the definitive monograph on one of the keystone events of the Vietnam War. Originally published in 1996, the revised edition of Tonkin Gulf includes the addition of previously unavailable sources which significantly strengthens Moïse’s work.

This chart tracks the positions of USS Maddox (DD 731) and USS Turner Joy (DD 951) from August 3-5, 1964, during the second part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Chart prepared for The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, Volume II, page 423. (NH 96350/ Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph)

Moïse provides a comprehensive history of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, including relevant background information on the Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A raids conducted against North Vietnam by American and Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese) forces, along with the U.S. Navy Desoto patrols, which were conducted in part to gather intelligence for the raids. The incidents of August 2 and August 4 themselves, as well as the subsequent American response, get the same meticulous treatment. In doing do, Moïse painstakingly charts the sequences of events which led to the American escalation of the conflict.

Importantly, Moïse provides a historian’s take on the various events; American and North Vietnamese perspectives are fully explored, from those who were directly involved in the incident such as the crews of the Maddox, Turner Joy, and North Vietnamese vessels as well as the high level commanders in Washington and Hanoi. This multi-faceted approach to sequencing events provides needed clarity to an often murky and chaotic situation. Employing a mostly chronological narrative structure, Moïse interjects where needed to contextualize events, people, and dates.

Captain John J. Herrick, USN, Commander Destroyer Division 192 (at left) and Commander Herbert L. Ogier, commanding officer of USS Maddox (DD 731), on board Maddox on August 13, 1964. They were in charge of the ship during her engagement with three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats on August 2,1964. (Photographer's Mate 3rd Class White/ Naval History and Heritage Command image)

Ultimately, Moïse concludes that no attack occurred on August 4, explaining that the American crews mistook false radar signatures, exacerbated by bad weather, for enemy boats and torpedoes. The author also explores the circumstances that led to the real combat which occurred on August 2, elucidating that the attack was not ordered by the North Vietnamese high command but was rather instigated by misunderstood orders from an officer lower in the chain of command. Accordingly, Moïse argues that the Johnson administration’s response was conceived hastily, before the facts of the matter became clear. Indeed, Moïse reveals that the administration was already planning retaliatory American strikes before Turner Joy even reported to be under attack, with intercepted North Vietnamese communication proof enough of an attack on the American destroyer.  Furthermore, Moïse shows that, upon learning of their genuine mistake, the Johnson administration did everything they could to obscure the fact that no attack took place on August 4.  Finally, they then brought to the Congress a resolution that had already been in preparation for months.

Moïse does not makes these claims baselessly. Indeed, he leaves no stone unturned, tirelessly reconstructing the events of August 1964. Declassified military documents, communications, and files are duly interrogated and are coupled with a bevy of secondary sources to flesh out the sequence of events. Moïse goes even further to cement his arguments with a litany of oral interviews with the people who were there, both American and Vietnamese. These sources coalesce in the narrative of Tonkin Gulf to form a cogent argument regarding the Tonkin Gulf Incident. Moïse’s addition of declassified NSA documents in the revised edition only strengthens the arguments made in the first addition; No attack occurred on August 4 and the Johnson administration knowingly obscured this fact once it became known. Interestingly, even officials in the Soviet Union initially believed Washington's assertions over Hanoi's denials.

Photograph taken from USS Maddox (DD 731) during her engagement with three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, 2 August 1964. The view shows one of the boats racing by, with what appears to be smoke from Maddox's shells in its wake. (Naval History and Heritage Command Image)

Tonkin Gulf stands as a testament to what professional, sober, and illuminating historical scholarship can and should be. Moïse interrogated and mined the available evidence on the Gulf of Tonkin incident to reconstruct the chaotic and controversial events of August 1964. Moïse provides both summary and analysis, interwoven in a coherent manner to produce the definitive history of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The 2019 revised edition of Tonkin Gulf is an important monograph that every serious scholar or researcher should consider when speaking authoritatively about the escalation of the Vietnam War.